From this point of view, let’s just say that Michael Jackson is lucky that Paul Campos’ opinion wasn’t the prevailing belief of his jurors.

If this is a fair description of the factual situation in Jackson’s case (it might not be, but the point is that many cases will feature this type of dilemma), then the formal rule that governs our criminal justice system required Jackson to be acquitted of this particular charge. 

That’s the formal rule. But every lawyer knows that, in this sort of situation, Jackson ran a serious risk of being convicted anyway. 

I’m not sure this is an altogether bad thing. If you as a juror have some doubt regarding the defendant’s guilt of the crime with which he is charged, but are practically certain, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, that he has committed legally identical crimes in the past, is it even inaccurate to say that you’re certain of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? 

After all, part of the calculus of what “reasonable doubt” means could well include whether you’re practically certain the defendant is guilty of this crime, if not necessarily this charge.

While I really don’t care about Jackson or his trial, I have to admit that this line of thinking is intriguing to me. On the one hand, it seems almost offensive to consider convicting someone for a crime that they haven’t been charged for; on the other hand, it seems foolish to let someone walk when you truly believe that while they are innocent of the current charges, they are dead guilty for previous transgressions.

Again, I’m not sure how I feel about that.